We study non-monetary markets where objects that arrive over time are allocated to unit-
demand agents with private types, such as in the allocation of public housing or deceased …

In this paper we show that, using only mild assumptions, previously proposed
multidimensional blockchain fee markets are essentially optimal, even against worst-case …

Healthcare is often allocated without prices, sacrificing efficiency in the interest of equity.
Wait times then typically serve as a substitute rationing mechanism, creating their own …

A designer relies on a costly screening device to allocate a set of goods, aiming to maximize
a social welfare function. We provide conditions for one screening device to dominate …

Motivated by our collaboration with a major refugee resettlement agency in the US, we study
a dynamic matching problem where each new arrival (a refugee case) must be matched …

We consider a multiclass, multiserver queueing system, in which customers of different types
have heterogeneous preferences over the many servers available. The goal of the service …

This dissertation examines the performance analysis and design of multi-class multi-server
bipartite queueing systems under a FCFS-ALIS service discipline. The class of queueing …

I. Research My principal research is in market design, which studies how the rules and
operations governing the marketplace affect economic outcomes. My research is both …