A survey on data pricing: from economics to data science

J Pei - IEEE Transactions on knowledge and Data …, 2020 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Data are invaluable. How can we assess the value of data objectively, systematically and
quantitatively? Pricing data, or information goods in general, has been studied and practiced …

[图书][B] Multiagent systems: Algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations

Y Shoham, K Leyton-Brown - 2008 - books.google.com
Multiagent systems combine multiple autonomous entities, each having diverging interests
or different information. This overview of the field offers a computer science perspective, but …

[PDF][PDF] Mechanism design and approximation

JD Hartline - Book draft. October, 2013 - jasonhartline.com
This text provides a look at select topics in economic mechanism design through the lens of
approximation. It reviews the classical economic theory of mechanism design wherein a …

Online data valuation and pricing for machine learning tasks in mobile health

A Xu, Z Zheng, F Wu, G Chen - IEEE INFOCOM 2022-IEEE …, 2022 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Mobile health (mHealth) applications, benefiting from mobile computing, have emerged
rapidly in recent years, and generated a large volume of mHealth data. However, these …

Competitive auctions with imperfect predictions

P Lu, Z Wan, J Zhang - Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on …, 2024 - dl.acm.org
The competitive auction was first proposed by Goldberg, Hartline, and Wright. In their paper
[Goldberg et al, 2001], they introduce the competitive analysis framework of online algorithm …

Envy, truth, and profit

J Hartline, Q Yan - Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on …, 2011 - dl.acm.org
We consider profit maximizing (incentive compatible) mechanism design in general
environments that include, eg, position auctions (for selling advertisements on Internet …

VAP: Online Data Valuation and Pricing for Machine Learning Models in Mobile Health

A Xu, Z Zheng, Q Li, F Wu… - IEEE Transactions on …, 2023 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Mobile health (mHealth) applications, benefiting from mobile computing, have generated
numerous mHealth data. However, they are dispersed across isolated devices, which …

Optimal competitive auctions

N Chen, N Gravin, P Lu - Proceedings of the forty-sixth annual ACM …, 2014 - dl.acm.org
We study the design of truthful auctions for selling identical items in unlimited supply (eg,
digital goods) to n unit demand buyers. This classic problem stands out from profit …

Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design

NR Devanur, JD Hartline, Q Yan - Journal of Economic Theory, 2015 - Elsevier
We consider the provision of an abstract service to single-dimensional agents. Our model
includes position auctions, single-minded combinatorial auctions, and constrained matching …

Optimal deterministic clock auctions and beyond

G Christodoulou, V Gkatzelis… - 13th Innovations in …, 2022 - drops.dagstuhl.de
We design and analyze deterministic and randomized clock auctions for single-parameter
domains with downward-closed feasibility constraints, aiming to maximize the social welfare …