We analyze an all-pay group contest in which individual members' efforts are aggregated via
the best-shot technology and the prize is a public good for the winning group. The interplay …

We study duopolies in which firms—each of which consists of an owner and a manager—
have the option of releasing or not to the public their contract information between the owner …

In this chapter, we review our knowledge as to how different ways of sharing a prize among
the members of a group in collective rent seeking affect individuals' incentives to contribute …

Competition between groups often involves prizes that have both a public and a private
component. The exact nature of the prize not only affects the strategic choice of the sharing …

Modern societies are characterized by competing organizations that rely predominantly on
incentive schemes to align the behavior of their members with the organizations' objectives …

We study contests in which players compete by expending irreversible effort to win a prize,
the prize is awarded to one of the players, the winner shares the prize with other players in …

This paper investigates Tullock group contests with the possibility of a draw in which the
winner, if any, shares the prize with other players in his group, and each group's sharing rule …

Contests between groups are prone to intra‐group externalities (free‐riding). Yet, costless
incentive schemes that entirely avoid free‐riding within a group might be undesirable, both …

This paper addresses conflicts between two groups when trying to win a group-specific
public good prize. We analyze how these contests are affected when groups are led by an …

We study a contest between teams that compete for multiple indivisible prizes. Team output
is a CES function of all the team members' efforts. We use a generalized Tullock contest …