Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked,
single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the …

A survey of papers on practically significant restrictions on the preference profile of a
collective is carried out, including single-peaked preferences, group-separable preferences …

Manipulation, bribery, and control are well-studied ways of changing the outcome of an
election. Many voting rules are, in the general case, computationally resistant to some of …

We analyze the complexity of several NP-hard election-related problems under the
assumptions that the voters have group-separable preferences. We show that under this …

We investigate the complexity of r-Approval control problems in k-peaked elections, where at
most k peaks are allowed in each vote with respect to an order of the candidates. Our study …

We study numerous restricted domains of dichotomous preferences with respect to some
tree structures. Particularly, we study the relationships among these domains and the ones …

We investigate the complexity of CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY ADDING/DELETING
VOTES (CCAV/CCDV) for r-approval, Condorcet, Maximin, and Copeland α in k-axes and k …

Recent research reveals that many NP-hard voting problems in general become polynomial-
time solvable in single-peaked elections. In contrast to these results, we prove for the first …

Understanding when and how computational complexity can be used to protect elections
against different manipulative actions has been a highly active research area over the past …

We study the complexity of voting control problems in multi-peaked elections. In particular,
we focus on the constructive/destructive control by adding/deleting votes under Condorcet …