We investigate a model of one-to-one matching with transferable utility and general
unobserved heterogeneity. Under a separability assumption that generalizes Choo and …

This paper empirically studies the distributional consequences of affirmative action in the
context of a centralized college admission system. We examine the effects of a large-scale …

In this paper I use detailed administrative data to study the effects of targeted school
vouchers on the outcomes of poor children in Chile. A difference-in-differences analysis …

Waitlists are often used to ration scarce resources, but the trade‐offs in designing these
mechanisms depend on agents' preferences. We study equilibrium allocations under …

We study the relevance of incorporating dynamic incentives and eliciting private information
about students' preferences to improve their welfare and downstream outcomes in …

Stimulus checks have become an increasingly important policy tool in recent US recessions.
How does the households' marginal propensity to spend (MPX) vary as checks become …

The rational choice framework for modeling matching markets has been tremendously
useful in guiding the design of school-assignment systems. Despite this success, a large …

While the mechanism design paradigm emphasizes notions of efficiency based on agent
preferences, policymakers often focus on alternative objectives. School districts emphasize …

Using unique data on preference rankings for all high school students who apply for college
in Ireland, we investigate whether, conditional on absolute achievement at the end of high …

We provide a general framework for incorporating many types of micro data from summary
statistics to full surveys of selected consumers into Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)-style …