Networks pervade social and economic life, and they play a prominent role in explaining a
huge variety of social and economic phenomena. Standard economic theory did not give …

We choose between alternatives without being fully informed about the rewards from
different courses of action. In making our decisions, we use our own past experience and the …

This paper proposes two (ordinal and cardinal) generalizations of [JC Harsanyi, R. Selten, A
General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and London …

We survey the recent literature on coordination games, where there is a conflict between risk
dominance and payoff dominance. Our main focus is on models of local interactions, where …

We study the long-run conventions emerging in a stag-hunt game when agents are myopic
best responders. Our main novel assumption is that errors converge to zero at a rate that is …

This paper presents a survey of research on learning with a special focus on the structure of
interaction between individual entities. The structure is formally modelled as a network: the …

The choice of a unique Nash equilibrium (NE) is crucial in theoretical classical and quantum
games. The Eisert–Wilkens–Lewenstein quantization scheme solves the prisoner's dilemma …

Models of Society and Complex Systems introduces readers to a variety of different
mathematical tools used for modelling human behaviour and interactions, and the complex …

Theoretical games, as well as many systems of industrial organization and international
trade, often have multiple equilibria. The choice of a unique equilibrium is crucial in such …

We revisit a result by Kim and Wong (2010) showing that under global interactions any strict
Nash equilibrium of a coordination game can be supported as long run equilibrium by …