This paper investigates static games with unawareness, where players may be unaware of
some of the choices that can be made. That is, different players may have different views on …

Strong-Δ-Rationalizability introduces first-order belief restrictions in the analysis of forward
induction reasoning. Without actual restrictions, it coincides with Strong Rationalizability …

We adopt the epistemic framework of Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) to model the
distinction between a player's behavior at each node, which is part of the external state, and …

We define a cautious version of extensive-form rationalizability for generalized extensive-
form games with unawareness that we call prudent rationalizability. It is an extensive-form …

In dynamic games, players may observe a deviation from a pre-play, possibly incomplete,
non-binding agreement before the game is over. The attempt to rationalize the deviation …

Backward Induction is a fundamental concept in game theory. As an algorithm, it can only be
used to analyze a very narrow class of games, but its logic is also invoked, albeit informally …

E-commerce technology and the growth of online shopping have pushed manufacturers to
apply a dual-channel supply chain strategy. It has also become critical for the service-only …

We propose a new rationalizability concept for dynamic games with imperfect information,
forward and backward rationalizability, that combines elements from forward and backward …

Dealing with a problem consists of understanding and solving. While there is vast literature
analyzing problem solving, this article focuses on understanding. The problems subjects …

At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the
opponents will play. If these theories are commonly known, players will refine their first-order …