In Conflict Resolution situations where two parties with opposed preferences need to make
a number of decisions simultaneously, we propose a simple mechanism that endows agents …

We propose strike mechanisms as a solution to the classical problem of Hurwicz and
Schmeidler (1978) and Maskin (1999) according to which, in two-person societies, no …

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment that investigates the prevalence of
median voter dynamics in the Meltzer-Richard redistribution mechanism. I focus on the …

Voting rules over three or more alternatives suffer from a general problem of manipulability.
However, if the rule is 'difficult'to manipulate, in some formal computational sense that is …

This study addresses the issue of sincere and sophisticated voting under majoritarian and
non-majoritarian voting procedures. By conducting experimental voting games, we …

Negotiation by veto is introduced as a novel negotiation approach and as an alternative to
the exchange of offers. Rather than proposing offers, negotiators following the negotiation by …

The tyranny of the majority is one of the most frequently discussed problems of democracy in
political theory. It arises when winning majorities are fixed and permanent, and there are no …

At the heart of this paper are judges and their obligations to ensure that conflicts over
fragmented rights are cured, that fundamental rights are stewarded, and that justice prevails …

Voting by Veto [VBV], developed by Dennis C. Mueller, is a two-stage voting mechanism for
committee decision making. In the first stage, every member of the committee makes a …

Voting by veto (VbV), developed by Dennis C. Mueller, is a two-stage voting mechanism for
committee decision making. In the first stage, every member of the group makes a proposal …