Fair division, a key concern in the design of many social institutions, has for 70 years been
the subject of interdisciplinary research at the interface of mathematics, economics, and …

The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer
science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making …

Matching problems with preferences are all around us: they arise when agents seek to be
allocated to one another on the basis of ranked preferences over potential outcomes …

A central issue in school choice is the design of a student assignment mechanism.
Education literature provides guidance for the design of such mechanisms but does not offer …

This paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment—for example,
assigning schedules of courses to students—based on an approximation to competitive …

Marketplaces are often small parts of large markets, and both markets and marketplaces
come in many varieties. Market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must …

The concept of fair division is as old as civil society itself. Aristotle's" equal treatment of
equals" was the first step toward a formal definition of distributive fairness. The concept of …

Economists have lately been called upon not only to analyze markets, but to design them.
Market design involves a responsibility for detail, a need to deal with all of a market's …

The notion of distortion in social choice problems has been defined to measure the loss in
efficiency--typically measured by the utilitarian social welfare, the sum of utilities of the …

A random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to
individual preferences over sure objects. Ordinal efficiency implies (is implied by) ex post (ex …