An imperfectly informed mediator (or mechanism designer) must make a decision on behalf
of a group of agents, who are privately informed about their valuations attached to the …

The paper examines information structures that can guarantee full surplus extraction via
collusion-proof mechanisms. Our collusion-proofness notion requires that there does not …

The literatures dealing with voting, optimal income taxation, implementation, and pure public
goods are drawn on here to address the problem of voting over income taxes to finance a …

We study auctions in an affiliated private value framework in which buyers face ambiguity
over the distribution of the others' valuations and make choices that are robust to that …

Society uses the following mechanism to decide on the supply of an experience good. Each
agent can choose whether or not to contribute to the good. Contributions are collected, and …

We study the implications of ambiguity for optimal fiscal policy in macro public finance
environments with heterogeneous agents and private idiosyncratic shocks. We describe …

We study the optimal auction design problem when bidders' preferences follow the maxmin
expected utility model. We suppose that each bidder's set of priors consists of beliefs close …

This paper provides a micro-foundation for approximate incentive compatibility using
ambiguity aversion. In particular, we propose a novel notion of approximate interim incentive …

This dissertation contributes to the field of mechanism design and, in particular, to the study
of robust mechanisms, which concerns the construction of allocation mechanisms that …

A mechanism designer must make a decision on behalf of a group of agents, who are
privately informed about their valuations attached to the decision. The designer is …