We consider repeated trading by sellers with persistent private information in dynamic
lemons markets. In an environment where buyers have temporary monopsony power …

There are important public debates on how—or even whether—to regulate information
about previous transactions in different markets. Examples are the regulation of cookies in …

We consider a dynamic adverse selection setting where a privately informed seller can
choose to reveal or withhold past trade information to privately informed buyers. Buyers …

This paper studies repeated trade with noisy information about previous transactions. A
buyer has private information about his willingness to pay, which is either low or high, and …

This paper studies bargaining between a seller and a buyer with binary private valuation.
Because the setting is more tractable than the case of general valuation distributions …

Essays in Microeconomic Theory Page 1 . Essays in Microeconomic Theory
Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors der …