Decades of research using a wide variety of detailed plant-and firm-level data has provided
strong evidence of persistent performance differences among seemingly similar enterprises …

A solution to marketplace information asymmetries is to have trading partners publicly rate
each other post-transaction. Many have shown these ratings are effective; we show that their …

We solve a general class of dynamic rational inattention problems in which an agent
repeatedly acquires costly information about an evolving state and selects actions. The …

As a platform improves trust between the two sides of its market to facilitate matching and
transactions, it faces an increased risk of disintermediation: with sufficient trust, the two sides …

We propose a model of firm reputation in which a firm can invest or disinvest in product
quality and the firm's reputation is defined as the market's belief about this quality. We …

Seller reputation is an important asset because buyers often choose sellers on the basis of
their reputation. This is particularly true when the quality of the good or service transacted is …

This paper surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information. We
first develop the adverse-selection approach to reputations in the context of a long-lived …

To mitigate inefficiencies arising from asymmetric information, some markets rely on
government interventions, whereas others rely on reputation systems, warranties, or …

In a product choice game played between a long lived seller and an infinite sequence of
buyers, we assume that buyers cannot observe past signals. To facilitate the analysis of …

We propose a model of cycles of conflict and distrust. Overlapping generations of agents
from two groups sequentially play coordination games under incomplete information about …