Why capital suppliers (usually) hire workers: What we know and what we need to know
GK Dow, L Putterman - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2000 - Elsevier
A fundamental question for economics is why large firms in market economies usually
assign control rights to capital suppliers rather than labor suppliers. A diverse collection of …
assign control rights to capital suppliers rather than labor suppliers. A diverse collection of …
[图书][B] Governing the firm: workers' control in theory and practice
GK Dow - 2003 - books.google.com
Most large firms are controlled by shareholders, who choose the board of directors and can
replace the firms management. In rare instances, however, control over the firm rests with …
replace the firms management. In rare instances, however, control over the firm rests with …
[图书][B] Organisation und management
M Kräkel - 1961 - books.google.com
Die Neuauflage berücksichtigt die Umstellung der Diplomstudiengänge auf Bachelor und
Master, so daß das Buch sowohl für Bachelor-Einführungsveranstaltungen als auch für …
Master, so daß das Buch sowohl für Bachelor-Einführungsveranstaltungen als auch für …
Characterizing team orientations and academic performance in cooperative project-based learning environments
Information technology professionals are required to possess both technical and
professional skills while functioning in teams. Higher education institutions are promoting …
professional skills while functioning in teams. Higher education institutions are promoting …
Profit sharing and monitoring in partnerships
We consider partnerships among risk-averse professionals endowed with (i) a risky and
personally-costly production technology and (ii) a personally-costly monitoring technology …
personally-costly production technology and (ii) a personally-costly monitoring technology …
Exogenous targeting instruments as a solution to group moral hazards
J Spraggon - Journal of Public Economics, 2002 - Elsevier
The ability of four instruments within the general class of exogenous targeting instruments,
proposed by Segerson [Journal of Environmental Economic Management 15 (1988) 87], to …
proposed by Segerson [Journal of Environmental Economic Management 15 (1988) 87], to …
[图书][B] The labor-managed firm: Theoretical foundations
GK Dow - 2018 - books.google.com
Cover--Half-title page--Title page--Copyright page--Dedication--Epigraph--Contents--List of
Figures--Preface--Part I Setting the Stage--1 The Puzzling Asymmetry--Part II Perfection and …
Figures--Preface--Part I Setting the Stage--1 The Puzzling Asymmetry--Part II Perfection and …
[图书][B] Angel investing in Finland: An analysis based on agency theory and the incomplete contracting theory
T Lahti - 2009 - helda.helsinki.fi
Wealthy individuals-business angels who invest a share of their net worth in entrepreneurial
ventures-form an essential part of an informal venture capital market that can secure funding …
ventures-form an essential part of an informal venture capital market that can secure funding …
Ambiguity in partnerships
D Kelsey, W Spanjers - The Economic Journal, 2004 - academic.oup.com
The consequences of ambiguity for partnerships are addressed. Partnerships with
symmetric linear production functions are analysed in a Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) …
symmetric linear production functions are analysed in a Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) …
Team incentives and organizational form
A Slivinski - Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
Conventional wisdom regarding nonprofit firms is that the absence of a profit motive renders
them inefficient. However, the costs and product quality realized by profit‐taking firms is …
them inefficient. However, the costs and product quality realized by profit‐taking firms is …