Fair and efficient allocations without obvious manipulations
We consider the fundamental problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among
strategic agents with additive valuation functions. It is well known that, in the absence of …
strategic agents with additive valuation functions. It is well known that, in the absence of …
Non-obvious manipulability for single-parameter agents and bilateral trade
A recent line of work in mechanism design has focused on guaranteeing incentive
compatibility for agents without contingent reasoning skills: obviously strategyproof …
compatibility for agents without contingent reasoning skills: obviously strategyproof …
Two-way greedy: Algorithms for imperfect rationality
The realization that selfish interests need to be accounted for in the design of algorithms has
produced many interesting and valuable contributions in computer science under the …
produced many interesting and valuable contributions in computer science under the …
Obviously strategyproof single-minded combinatorial auctions
B De Keijzer, M Kyropoulou… - … Colloquium on Automata …, 2020 - drops.dagstuhl.de
We consider the setting of combinatorial auctions when the agents are single-minded and
have no contingent reasoning skills. We are interested in mechanisms that provide the right …
have no contingent reasoning skills. We are interested in mechanisms that provide the right …
New constructions of obviously strategyproof mechanisms
Catering to the incentives of people with limited rationality is a challenging research
direction that requires novel paradigms to design mechanisms. Obviously strategy-proof …
direction that requires novel paradigms to design mechanisms. Obviously strategy-proof …
Obviously strategyproof mechanisms for machine scheduling
Catering to the incentives of people with limited rationality is a challenging research
direction that requires novel paradigms to design mechanisms and approximation …
direction that requires novel paradigms to design mechanisms and approximation …
Adaptive incentive engineering in citizen-centric AI
Adaptive incentives are a valuable tool shown to improve the efficiency of complex
multiagent systems and could produce win-win situations for all stakeholders. However, their …
multiagent systems and could produce win-win situations for all stakeholders. However, their …
[HTML][HTML] Approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms: the case of machine scheduling and facility location
D Ferraioli, C Ventre - Algorithmica, 2021 - Springer
Obvious strategyproofness (OSP) is an appealing concept as it allows to maintain incentive
compatibility even in the presence of agents that are not fully rational, ie, those who struggle …
compatibility even in the presence of agents that are not fully rational, ie, those who struggle …
Automated optimal osp mechanisms for set systems: The case of small domains
Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms have recently come to the fore as a tool to deal
with imperfect rationality. They, in fact, incentivize people with no contingent reasoning skills …
with imperfect rationality. They, in fact, incentivize people with no contingent reasoning skills …
Multi-agent systems for computational economics and finance
M Kampouridis, P Kanellopoulos… - AI …, 2022 - content.iospress.com
In this article we survey the main research topics of our group at the University of Essex. Our
research interests lie at the intersection of theoretical computer science, artificial …
research interests lie at the intersection of theoretical computer science, artificial …