Optimal combinations of upfront fees and royalties are considered for a cost-reducing
innovation in a Cournot oligopoly for both outside and incumbent innovators. It is shown that …

We study optimal linear licensing and its social welfare implications when the innovator
(patentee) is an insider that can make capacity/output commitment so as to act as a …

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that exclusive owners of an advanced
technology are always better off when producing as a monopolist than when competing …

The separation between ownership and control has become common practice over the last
century, in most medium and large firms across the world. Throughout the twentieth century …

The question of an optimal licensing contract in a leadership structure is studied when the
patent holder is a non‐producer and has three alternative licensing strategies, namely fixed …

We consider the problem of patent licensing in a Cournot duopoly in which the innovator
(patentee) is one of the firms and it is capacity constrained. We show that when the patentee …

Newly developed technologies run the risk of being imitated when patents are long and
imitation cost is low. This paper shows that the innovator has the incentive to postpone …

It is known that if exogenous cost heterogeneities between the firms in a spatial duopoly
model are large, then the model does not have a pure-strategy equilibrium in location …

In this paper we consider the licensing of a cost‐reducing innovation by an outside innovator
that uses optimal combinations of upfront fees and royalties in a Cournot duopoly …

It has been argued that a monopolist input supplier may find it profitable to create an outside
source for its input if it reduces product price and attracts buyers (Farrell and Gallini …