Theories that link domestic politics, domestic institutional structures, and leader incentives to
foreign affairs have flowered in the past 25 years or so. By unpacking institutional variation …

Uncertainty about capabilities, intent, or resolve has long been linked to war. More recently,
the bargaining model of war has established uncertainty, also referred to as asymmetric …

States in an international dispute sometimes choose to attack their enemies with their own
military forces but other times choose to empower domestic insurgent groups. What explains …

“Why We Fight reflects Blattman's expertise in economics, political science, and history…
Blattman is a great storyteller, with important insights for us all.”—Richard H. Thaler, winner …

Why do some leaders and segments of the public display remarkable persistence in
confrontations in international politics, while others cut and run? The answer given by …

Why do some countries choose to end wars short of total victory while others fight on,
sometimes in the face of appalling odds? How Wars End argues that two central factors …

The previous several decades have witnessed a growth in empirically based theories of
international conflict. To those of us actively doing research and writing in this field, as …

We study two different varieties of uncertainty that countries can face in international crises
and establish general results about the relationship between these sources of uncertainty …

According to a leading rationalist explanation, war can break out when a large, rapid shift of
power causes a credible commitment problem. This mechanism does not specify how …

In typical crisis bargaining models, strong actors must convince the opponent that they are
not bluffing and the only way to do so is through costly signaling. However, in a war, strong …