Mechanism design without quasilinearity
T Kazumura, D Mishra, S Serizawa - Theoretical Economics, 2020 - Wiley Online Library
This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences
need not be quasilinear. In such a model,(i) we characterize dominant strategy incentive …
need not be quasilinear. In such a model,(i) we characterize dominant strategy incentive …
When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?
AI Kushnir, LV Lokutsievskiy - Theoretical Economics, 2021 - Wiley Online Library
We provide sufficient conditions for a monotone function with a finite set of outcomes to be
cyclically monotone. Using these conditions, we show that any monotone function defined …
cyclically monotone. Using these conditions, we show that any monotone function defined …
Implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains
D Mishra, S Roy - Theoretical Economics, 2013 - Wiley Online Library
We consider deterministic dominant strategy implementation in multidimensional
dichotomous domains in a private values and quasilinear utility setting. In such …
dichotomous domains in a private values and quasilinear utility setting. In such …
Tropical geometry and mechanism design
RA Crowell, NM Tran - arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.04880, 2016 - arxiv.org
We develop a novel framework to construct and analyze finite valued, multidimensional
mechanisms using tropical convex geometry. We geometrically characterize incentive …
mechanisms using tropical convex geometry. We geometrically characterize incentive …
Non-bossy single object auctions
We study deterministic single object auctions in the private values environment. We show
that an allocation rule is implementable (in dominant strategies) and non-bossy if and only if …
that an allocation rule is implementable (in dominant strategies) and non-bossy if and only if …
On the equivalence of weak-and cyclic-monotonicity
A Kushnir, L Lokutsievskiy - Available at SSRN 3422846, 2019 - papers.ssrn.com
We provide an approach to studying the equivalence of weak-and cyclic-monotonicity
conditions in convex and non-convex domains with a finite set of outcomes. Using this …
conditions in convex and non-convex domains with a finite set of outcomes. Using this …
Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
PH Edelman, JA Weymark - Economic Theory, 2021 - Springer
Necessary conditions for dominant strategy implementability of an allocation function on a
restricted type space are identified when utilities are quasilinear and the set of alternatives is …
restricted type space are identified when utilities are quasilinear and the set of alternatives is …
Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
PH Edelman, JA Weymark - Available at SSRN 2972177, 2018 - papers.ssrn.com
Necessary conditions for dominant strategy implementability of an allocation function on a
restricted type space are identified when utilities are quasilinear and the set of alternatives is …
restricted type space are identified when utilities are quasilinear and the set of alternatives is …
[PDF][PDF] Dominant strategy implementability, zero length cycles, and affine maximizers
PH Edelman, JA Weymark - 2017 - accessecon.com
Necessary conditions for dominant strategy implementability on a restricted type space are
identified for a finite set of alternatives. For any one-person mechanism obtained by fixing …
identified for a finite set of alternatives. For any one-person mechanism obtained by fixing …
Unrestricted domain extensions of dominant strategy implementable allocation functions
PH Edelman, JA Weymark - Social Design: Essays in Memory of Leonid …, 2019 - Springer
It is shown that any one-person dominant strategy implementable allocation function on a
restricted domain of types can be extended to the unrestricted domain in such a way that …
restricted domain of types can be extended to the unrestricted domain in such a way that …