Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a metatheory is a theory about
theories, the meta-problem is a problem about a problem. The initial problem is the hard …

It'sa common idea in philosophy that we possess concepts of a peculiar kind by which we
can think about our conscious states in 'inner'and 'direct'ways, as for example, when I attend …

It is widely agreed among contemporary philosophers of mind that science leaves us with an
'explanatory gap'—that even after we know everything that science can tell us about the …

In recent literature on the metaphysics of consciousness, and in particular on the prospects
of physicalism, there are two interesting strands of discussion. One strand concerns the so …

Many philosophers have tried to defend physicalism concerning phenomenal
consciousness, by explaining dualist intuitions within a purely physicalist framework. One of …

The universe is in some sense a numerical holographic structure. About 15 billion years ago
all of the matter and energy in the universe was concentrated into an area the size of a …

Numerous philosophers have recently tried to defend physicalism regarding phenomenal
consciousness against dualist intuitions, by explaining the existence of dualist intuitions …

This is a dialogue between an opponent of the phenomenal concept strategy and Mary from
Frank Jackson's knowledge argument. In this dialogue, Mary, who has complete physical …

In this paper, I propose and defend an antiphysicalist argument, namely, the imagination
argument, which draws inspiration from Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, or rather its …

–Le présent article esquisse un modèle cognitif de «l'intuition de différence» entre le
phénoménal et le physique. Mettant à profit un modèle élaboré conjointement par des …