The technology of decentralized finance (DeFi)

R Auer, B Haslhofer, S Kitzler, P Saggese, F Victor - Digital Finance, 2024 - Springer
Abstract Decentralized Finance (DeFi) is a new financial paradigm that leverages distributed
ledger technologies to offer services such as lending, investing, or exchanging cryptoassets …

Decentralized finance: Protocols, risks, and governance

A Capponi, G Iyengar… - Foundations and Trends …, 2023 - nowpublishers.com
Financial markets are undergoing an unprecedented transformation. Technological
advances have brought major improvements to the operations of financial services. While …

Arbitrageurs' profits, LVR, and sandwich attacks: batch trading as an AMM design response

A Canidio, R Fritsch - arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.02074, 2023 - arxiv.org
We consider an automated market maker (AMM) in which all trades are batched and
executed at a price equal to the marginal price (ie, the price of an arbitrary small trade) after …

[图书][B] The Economics of Blockchain Consensus: Exploring the Key Tradeoffs in Blockchain Design

J Gans - 2023 - books.google.com
Blockchain technologies have been rapidly adopted for the creation of cryptocurrencies and
have been explored for a myriad of applications. While this is of important economic interest …

Towards stronger blockchains: Security against front-running attacks

A Misra, AD Kshemkalyani - International Conference on Networked …, 2024 - Springer
Blockchains add transactions to a distributed shared ledger by arriving at consensus on sets
of transactions contained in blocks. This provides a total ordering on a set of global …

Batching trades on automated market makers

A Canidio, R Fritsch - 5th Conference on Advances in Financial …, 2023 - drops.dagstuhl.de
We consider an automated market maker (AMM) in which all trades are batched and
executed at a price equal to the marginal price (ie, the price of an arbitrarily small trade) after …

Maximal extractable value and allocative inefficiencies in public blockchains

A Capponi - Available at SSRN 4931619, 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
We argue that the transparent observability of pending transactions in public distributed
ledgers leads to suboptimal allocation of blockspace. We show that augmenting these …

Cryptography Versus Incentives

J Gans - The Economics of Blockchain Consensus: Exploring …, 2023 - Springer
This chapter explores the trade-off between using cryptography and incentives in blockchain
systems, particularly in the context of smart contracts. Cryptography provides security and …

[PDF][PDF] Allocative inefficiencies in public distributed ledgers

A Capponi, R Jia, Y Wang - Preprint, submitted January, 2022 - newyorkfed.org
In public blockchains, the visibility of pending transactions can lead to suboptimal
blockspace allocation. To mitigate this, users can submit their transactions through private …

Decentralized commit-reveal scheme to defend against front-running attacks on Decentralized EXchanges

N Choi, H Kim - 2024 IEEE International Conference on …, 2024 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
In this paper, we focus on the security issues of decentralized exchanges (DEXs),
specifically on front-running attacks. Front-running attacks, which exploit the transparency of …