We identify a specific channel (debt covenants) and the corresponding mechanism (transfer
of control rights) through which financing frictions impact corporate investment. Using a …

We provide evidence that creditors play an active role in the governance of corporations well
outside of payment default states. By examining the Securities and Exchange Commission's …

Although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions, the
presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender's incentives to do this. Thus loan …

Using a novel dataset that records individual debt issues on the balance sheets of public
firms, we demonstrate that traditional capital structure studies that ignore debt heterogeneity …

We present novel empirical evidence that conflicts of interest between creditors and their
borrowers have a significant impact on firm investment policy. We examine a large sample of …

Using a sample of over 5,000 debt issues, I test whether firms with more extensive use of
covenants in their public debt contracts exhibit timelier recognition of economic losses in …

This paper investigates whether changes in Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) affect corporate investment decisions. Using a sample containing forty nine changes …

Despite the importance of banks' role as delegated monitors, little is known about how non-
price terms of loan contracts are structured to optimize information production in a lending …

This study uses covenant violations to provide evidence on how firms make disclosure
decisions in the presence of enhanced bank monitoring. Using a regression discontinuity …

Using an extensive data set on corporate bond defaults in the US from 1866 to 2010, we
study the macroeconomic effects of bond market crises and contrast them with those …