We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending
the classical substitutes condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable …

We examine a dynamic, two‐sided, one‐to‐one matching market where agents on both
sides interact over a period of time. We define and identify sufficient conditions for the …

Istudydynamicmatchingmarketswherematch…, andmatching is one-to-one and irreversible.
The proposed stability notion, dynamic stability, incorporates a backward induction notion to …

Asylum seekers are often assigned to a locality in their host country directly upon arrival
based on some type of uninformed dynamic matching system which does not take the …

This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model
departs from the Gale–Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long‐lived players …

We analyze a T-period, two-sided, one-to-one matching market without monetary transfers.
Under natural restrictions on agents' preferences, which accommodate switching costs …

We propose a new solution concept in the roommate problem, based on the" robustness" of
deviations (ie, blocking coalitions). We call a deviation from a matching robust up to depth k …

This paper introduces a model for multi-period many-to-one matchings with transfers and
proposes a solution concept called individually rational recursive core (IRRC) in which no …

This dissertation investigates the advantages of optimization and machine learning
algorithms to characterize, predict, and solve Response Planning and Preparedness …

We propose a new solution concept in the roommate problem, based on the “robustness” of
deviations (ie, blocking coalitions). We call a deviation from a matching robust up to depth k …