Multi-agent decision problems, in which independent agents have to agree on a joint plan of
action or allocation of resources, are central to AI. In such situations, agents' individual …

We suggest a new model for strategic voting based on local dominance, where voters
consider a set of possible outcomes without assigning probabilities to them. We prove that …

In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators
jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the remaining …

The usage of automated learning agents is becoming increasingly prevalent in many online
economic applications such as online auctions and automated trading. Motivated by such …

In multiagent systems, social choice functions can help aggregate the distinct preferences
that agents have over alternatives, enabling them to settle on a single choice. Despite the …

Social choice theory deals with aggregating the preferences of multiple individuals
regarding several available alternatives, a situation colloquially known as voting. There are …

There is a vast literature which conceives Approval Voting as a mechanism where the
approval of voters is a mere strategic action with no intrinsic meaning. As usual, a group of …

Multi-agent decision problems, in which independent agents have to agree on a joint plan of
action or allocation of resources, are central to artificial intelligence. In such situations …

We consider best-reply dynamics for voting games in which all players are strategic and no
coalitions are formed. We study the class of scoring rules, show convergence of a suitably …

Voting is widely used to aggregate the different preferences of agents, even though these
agents are often able to manipulate the outcome through strategic voting. Most research on …