Adverse selection is a classic market failure known to limit or “unravel”'trade in high-quality
insurance and many other economic settings. While the standard theory emphasizes quality …

We study an agency model in which the principal knows the agent-optimal actions in
response to K “known” contracts but is unaware of other actions available or their costs, and …

We measure the impacts of vertical integration between insurers and hospitals. In the
Chilean market, where half of private hospital capacity is vertically integrated, integration …

Distinct risks are typically insured separately. A single'aggregate'contract that pays more
when many shocks occur simultaneously, but less when positive shocks self-insure negative …

This paper examines how market power affects coverage in a general class of insurance
models. We show that market power decreases coverage for individuals who are less willing …

By screening physicians with differentiated contracts, healthcare payers might better
address underand over-treatment. I characterize how efficiency depends on the dispersion …

Under asymmetric information, adverse selection can lead to distortions in the level of
insurance coverage purchased. This paper identifies an understudied dimension of sorting …

Regulators often impose rules that constrain the behavior of market participants. We study
the design of regulatory policy in an insurance market as a delegation problem. A regulator …

In the presence of adverse selection, mergers can increase welfare. Mergers affect welfare
through two channels: a reduction in inefficient sorting and an increase in markups. The …

Large-scale infrastructure investments are often carried out in set-tings where their eventual
usefulness or importance is diffi cult to pre-dict. This paper studies optimal incentives for …