Publisher Summary The study of stable coalition structures, or more generally of coalition
formation, was conducted mainly within the framework of games in coalitional form. The …

Several recently published studies concerned with the validation of willingness-to-pay
estimates derived with the contingent valuation (CV) method have utilized methods similar to …

Economists often ask how private information is shared through markets, costly signaling,
and other mechanisms. Yet most information sharing is done through ordinary, informal talk …

We survey the experimental literature on communication of private information via cheap-
talk messages. The focus is on work that is firmly grounded in theory. We discuss the …

Mediators are often thought to be more effective if they are unbiased or have no preferences
over the issue in dispute. This article presents a game theoretic model of mediation drawing …

We study a model in which perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker
whose actions affect the welfare of all. Experts are biased and thus may wish to pull the …

There are many economic problems which, when modelled as games of incomplete
information, give rise to many sequential equilibria, severely limiting the usefulness of the …

With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message—
even when one side is strictly better informed than the other.(“Cheap talk” means plain …

This thesis offers a general game theoretic model of language use and interpretation and
applies it to linguistic pragmatics in the vein of (Grice 1989). The model presented here …

There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford–Sobel (CS) model of
strategic information transmission. This paper identifies a simple condition on equilibrium …