Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-
Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to …

A number of labor markets and student placement systems can be modeled as many-to-one
matching markets. We analyze the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets …

Matching problems under preferences have been studied widely in mathematics, computer
science and economics, starting with the seminal paper by Gale and Shapley (1962). A …

We study two generalised stable matching problems motivated by the current matching
scheme used in the higher education sector in Hungary. The first problem is an extension of …

This paper analyzes the sequential admissions procedure for medical subjects at public
universities in Germany. Complete information equilibrium outcomes are shown to be …

We study the Student-Project Allocation problem (SPA), a generalisation of the classical
Hospitals/Residents problem (HR). An instance of SPA involves a set of students, projects …

School districts in the United States and around the world are increasingly moving away
from traditional neighborhood school assignment, in which pupils attend closest schools to …

Student admissions, for both secondary and higher education in Hungary, are organised by
centralised matching schemes. The program for secondary schools is based on the original …

This paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing (subselections of) the core
correspondence of matching markets. We provide a sequential mechanism which mimics a …

Abstract The Hospitals/Residents problem with Couples (hrc) models the allocation of
intending junior doctors to hospitals where couples are allowed to submit joint preference …