Publisher Summary This chapter discusses the game-theory literature on cost allocation.
Cost allocation not only provides internal signals that guide a firm's operations but also may …

Environments with public goods are a wonderful playground for those interested in delicate
experimental problems, serious theoretical challenges, and difficult mechanism design …

It is proved that Groves' scheme is unique on restricted domains which are smoothly
connected, in particular convex domains. This generalizes earlier uniqueness results by …

Publisher Summary A resource-allocation mechanism is viewed as a gigantic information
processing system. Such a system utilizes the knowledge dispersed among economic …

In a broad class of situations not covered by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem it is shown
that one cannot design a strategy-proof choice mechanism which attains Pareto optimal …

Although discussions of the role of private incentives have been included in writings on
economics and political economy for more than two hundred years–at least as far back as …

BAYESIAN IMPLEMENTATION Page 1 Page 2 Harwood Fundamentals of Pure and Applied
Economics BAYESIAN IMPLEMENTATION h # fly ap S f - 1 * Fran^% Page 3 FUNDAMENTALS …

A number of recent papers have developed a variety of ways of overcoming the free‐rider
problem. This essay presents a survey and exposition of these contributions and suggests …

Efficient incentive-compatible schemes for resolving hidden action and hidden information
problems have been shown to exist, thereby offering the hope that public goods can be …

We consider situations in which a society tries to efficiently allocate several homogeneous
and indivisible goods among agents. Each agent receives at most one unit of the good. In …