This paper studies vertical integration in serial supply chains with a wholesale price contract.
We consider a business environment where the contracting leader may be endogenously …

In cooperative Cournot oligopoly games, it is known that the β-core is equal to the α-core,
and both are non-empty if every individual profit function is continuous and concave (Zhao …

We present sufficient conditions involving the inverse demand function and the cost
functions to establish the convexity of oligopoly TU-games without transferable technologies …

This book provides an alternative approach to study the pre-kernel solution of transferable
utility games based on a generalized conjugation theory from convex analysis. Although the …

We consider a linear oligopoly TU game without transferable technologies in which the
characteristic function is determined from different perspectives. In so-called γ-, δ-, and ζ …

Rather than considering fairness as some private property or a subjective feeling of an
individual, we study fairness on a set of principles (axioms) which describes the pre-kernel …

We consider Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products. We assume that the
demand system is Shubik's and that firms operate at a constant and identical marginal and …

Time consistency is a property of the solution to a cooperative dynamic game which
guarantees that this solution remains stable with respect to its revision by players over time …

In this article we study interval games in oligopolies following the γ γ-approach. First, we
analyze their non-cooperative foundation and show that each coalition is associated with an …

The main purpose is to prove the supermodularity (convexity) property of a cooperative
game arising from an economical situation. The underlying oligopoly situation is based on a …