Predictive algorithms are playing an increasing role in our lives, and with this increasing
influence has come an increasing concern with the ways in which they might be unfair or …

Historical patterns of discrimination seem to present us with conflicts between what morality
requires and what we epistemically ought to believe. I will argue that these cases lend …

This paper is about an overlooked aspect—the cognitive or epistemic aspect—of the moral
demand we place on one another to be treated well. We care not only how people act …

Sometimes epistemologists theorize about belief, a tripartite attitude on which one can
believe, withhold belief, or disbelieve a proposition. In other cases, epistemologists theorize …

Several authors have recently suggested that moral factors and norms 'encroach'on the
epistemic, and because of salient parallels to pragmatic encroachment views in …

In discussions of whether and how pragmatic considerations can make a difference to what
one ought to believe, two sets of cases feature. The first set, which dominates the debate …

A common conception holds that epistemic justification is a matter of probabilistic likelihood
given the evidence. On this widely held view, a claim is epistemically justified if it meets a …

When faced with a dilemma between believing what is supported by an impartial
assessment of the evidence (eg, that one's friend is guilty of a crime) and believing what …

In this chapter, I argue that morality might bear on belief in at least two conceptually distinct
ways. The first is that morality might bear on belief by bearing on ques-tions of justification …

In this paper, I argue that the relationship between belief and credence is a central question
in epistemology. This is because the belief-credence relationship has significant …