This paper constructs an efficient, budget‐balanced, Bayesian incentive‐compatible
mechanism for a general dynamic environment with quasilinear payoffs in which agents …

We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when
participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which …

A bidding process can be organized so that offers are submitted simultaneously or
sequentially. In the latter case, potential buyers can condition their behavior on previous …

Investigating potential purchases is often a substantial investment under uncertainty.
Standard market designs, such as simultaneous or English auctions, compound this with …

When participating in school choice, students often spend substantial effort acquiring
information about schools. We investigate how two popular mechanisms incentivize …

A rational bidder in a private-value auction should be reluctant to incur the cost of perfectly
estimating his value if it might not matter to the success of his bidding strategy. This can …

Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in
return. This may pose a difficult problem either when agents receiving those goods have …

Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to
standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relative performance of two such …

The choice of an auction mechanism influences which object characteristics bidders learn
about and whether the object is allocated efficiently. Some object characteristics are valued …

When selling a business by auction, sellers typically use indicative bids—nonbinding
preliminary bids—to select a small number of bidders to conduct due diligence and submit …