Population games and deterministic evolutionary dynamics
WH Sandholm - Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 2015 - Elsevier
Population games describe strategic interactions among large numbers of small,
anonymous agents. Behavior in these games is typically modeled dynamically, with agents …
anonymous agents. Behavior in these games is typically modeled dynamically, with agents …
On the existence of Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games
O Carbonell-Nicolau… - Mathematics of Operations …, 2018 - pubsonline.informs.org
On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Page 1 MATHEMATICS OF
OPERATIONS RESEARCH Vol. 43, No. 1, February 2018, pp. 100–129 http://pubsonline.informs.org/journal/moor …
OPERATIONS RESEARCH Vol. 43, No. 1, February 2018, pp. 100–129 http://pubsonline.informs.org/journal/moor …
On the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in large games
G Carmona, K Podczeck - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
Over the years, several formalizations and existence results for games with a continuum of
players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler [D. Schmeidler, Equilibrium …
players have been given. These include those of Schmeidler [D. Schmeidler, Equilibrium …
The Dvoretzky-Wald-Wolfowitz theorem and purification in atomless finite-action games
Abstract In 1951, Dvoretzky, Wald and Wolfowitz (henceforth DWW) showed that
corresponding to any mixed strategy into a finite action space, there exists a pure-strategy …
corresponding to any mixed strategy into a finite action space, there exists a pure-strategy …
On equilibria in constrained generalized games with the weak continuous inclusion property
MA Khan, RP McLean, M Uyanik - Journal of Mathematical Analysis and …, 2024 - Elsevier
In this paper, we present results that use Himmelberg's fixed point theorem to highlight
substantive trade-offs between compactness, continuity and convexity postulates in the …
substantive trade-offs between compactness, continuity and convexity postulates in the …
On constrained generalized games with action sets in non-locally-convex and non-Hausdorff topological vector spaces
MA Khan, RP McLean, M Uyanik - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2024 - Elsevier
This paper presents results on the existence of an equilibrium in the context of a typology
consisting of qualitative, generalized and constrained generalized normal form games with …
consisting of qualitative, generalized and constrained generalized normal form games with …
Existence of Nash equilibrium in games with a measure space of players and discontinuous payoff functions
G Carmona, K Podczeck - Journal of Economic Theory, 2014 - Elsevier
Abstract Balder's [6] model of games with a measure space of players is integrated with the
line of research on finite-player games with discontinuous payoff functions which follows …
line of research on finite-player games with discontinuous payoff functions which follows …
Savage games
S Grant, I Meneghel, R Tourky - Theoretical Economics, 2016 - Wiley Online Library
We define and discuss Savage games, which are ordinal games of incomplete information
set in LJ Savage's framework of purely subjective uncertainty. Every Bayesian game is …
set in LJ Savage's framework of purely subjective uncertainty. Every Bayesian game is …
Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts: Concepts and Analysis with emphasis on Strategic substitutabilities
R Guesnerie, P Jara-Moroni - Economic Theory, 2011 - Springer
We consider an economic model that features (1) a continuum of agents and (2) an
aggregate state of the world over which agents have an infinitesimal influence. We first …
aggregate state of the world over which agents have an infinitesimal influence. We first …
Debreu's social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents
NC Yannelis - Economic Theory, 2009 - Springer
We provide several different generalizations of Debreu's social equilibrium theorem by
allowing for asymmetric information and a continuum of agents. The results not only extend …
allowing for asymmetric information and a continuum of agents. The results not only extend …