We consider a multi-receiver Bayesian persuasion problem where an informed sender tries
to persuade a group of receivers to adopt a certain product. The sender is allowed to commit …

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational
receivers that take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the …

We initiate the study of $\textit {behavioral information design} $ through deep learning. In
information design, a $\textit {sender} $ aims to persuade a $\textit {receiver} $ to take certain …

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information
to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. Classical models make the stringent …

We consider a new problem of selling data to a machine learner who looks to purchase data
to train his machine learning model. A key challenge in this setup is that neither the seller …

We study a repeated persuasion setting between a sender and a receiver, where at each
time t, the sender shares information about a payoff-relevant state with the receiver. The …

Consider a set of agents (receivers) whose payoffs depend on an underlying state of the
world as well as each other's actions. Suppose that a designer (sender) commits to a …

In the principal-agent problem formulated by Myerson [Mye82], agents have private
information (type) and make private decisions (action), both of which are unobservable to …

Modern ad auctions allow advertisers to target more specific segments of the user
population. Unfortunately, this is not always in the best interest of the ad platform–partially …

Persuasion studies how a principal can influence agents' decisions via strategic information
revelation---often described as a signaling scheme---in order to yield the most desirable …