The mechanism design approach to student assignment involves the theoretical, empirical,
and experimental study of systems used to allocate students into schools around the world …

The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer
science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making …

School choice may lead to improvements in school productivity if parents' choices reward
effective schools and punish ineffective ones. This mechanism requires parents to choose …

We've heard plenty from politicians and experts on affirmative action and higher education,
about how universities should intervene—if at all—to ensure a diverse but deserving student …

Matching problems with preferences are all around us: they arise when agents seek to be
allocated to one another on the basis of ranked preferences over potential outcomes …

Matching is a classic problem with a rich history and a significant impact, both on the theory
of algorithms and in practice. Recently there has been a surge of interest in the online …

This paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment—for example,
assigning schedules of courses to students—based on an approximation to competitive …

Marketplaces are often small parts of large markets, and both markets and marketplaces
come in many varieties. Market design seeks to understand what marketplaces must …

We develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the
college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and …

This paper" peeks under the covers" at the subsystems that provide the basic functionality of
a leading content delivery network. Based on our experiences in building one of the largest …