We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-monetary-transfer allocation of indivisible
objects based on priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money …

We consider probabilistic allocation of objects under ordinal preferences and constraints on
allocations. We devise an allocation mechanism, called the vigilant eating rule (VER), that …

We introduce the notion of sticky-stability in order to accommodate appeal costs in real-life
school-choice systems. When appealing is costly, students (or parents) may not find it worth …

In the allocation of indivisible objects under weak priorities, a common practice is to break
the ties using a lottery and to randomize over deterministic mechanisms. Such …

We consider stability concepts for random matchings where agents have preferences over
objects and objects have priorities for the agents. When matchings are deterministic, the …

A probabilistic approach to the stable matching problem has been identified as an important
research area with several important open problems. When considering random matchings …

Abstract Afacan (Games and Economic Behavior 110: 71-89, 2018) introduces an object
allocation with random priorities problem. He proposes the constrained probabilistic serial …

The localization of underwater sensors is the most crucial task in underwater wireless
sensor networks (UWSNs). The sensors, which are situated under the water, sense data …

個人或組織在進行決策選擇時, 若被選擇對象亦具有可選擇性時, 稱為雙向決策選擇行為.
在雙向選擇之情境下, 雙方應如何進行最適選擇行為, 為本研究欲探討之主題. Gale and Shapley …

Matching theory is a rapidly growing field in economics that often deals with markets in
which monetary transfers are forbidden. Hence, policy makers often use centralized …