We construct an ascending auction for heterogeneous objects by applying a primal-dual
algorithm to a linear program that represents the efficient-allocation problem for this setting …

For many years the Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction (SMRA) has been the primary
auction design for spectrum sales worldwide. Recently, the core-selecting Combinatorial …

In persuasion problems where the receiver's action is one-dimensional and his utility is
single-peaked, optimal signals are characterized by duality, based on a first-order approach …

We study a combinatorial market design problem, where a collection of indivisible objects is
to be priced and sold to potential buyers subject to equilibrium constraints. The classic …

We consider a discrete facility location problem with a new form of equity criterion. The
model discussed in the paper analyzes the case where demand points only have strict …

The notion of envy-freeness is a natural and intuitive fairness requirement in resource
allocation. With indivisible goods, such fair allocations are not guaranteed to exist. Classical …

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods when monetary compensations are
possible. First, we characterize the set of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. Second …

A single valuable object must be allocated to at most one of n agents. Monetary transfers are
possible and preferences are quasilinear. We offer an explicit description of the individually …

We consider the problem of allocating finitely many units of an indivisible good among a
group of agents when each agent receives at most one unit of the good and pays a non …

We investigate the implications of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler in QJ
Econ 92: 671–687, 1978) together with queue efficiency and strategyproofness in the …