The study of multi-agent systems (MAS) focuses on systems in which many intelligent agents
interact with each other. These agents are considered to be autonomous entities such as …

Social choice theory concerns the design and formal analysis of methods for aggregating
the preferences of multiple agents. Examples of such methods include voting procedures …

Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in
some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has …

Uncertainty arises in preference aggregation in several ways. There may, for example, be
uncertainty in the votes or the voting rule. Such uncertainty can introduce computational …

To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences
as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated …

We investigate the extent to which it is possible to compute the probability of a particular
candidate winning an election, given imperfect information about the preferences of the …

We study the computational complexity of the counting version of the Possible-Winner
problem for elections. In the Possible-Winner problem we are given a profile of voters, each …

Preferences are not always expressible via complete linear orders: sometimes it is more
natural to allow for the presence of incomparable outcomes. This may hold both in the …

A single-elimination (SE) tournament is a popular way to select a winner both in sports
competitions and in elections. A natural and well-studied question is the tournament fixing …

Voting is a simple mechanism to aggregate the preferences of agents. Many voting rules
have been shown to be NP-hard to manipulate. However, a number of recent theoretical …