Land finance in China: Analysis and review

J Gyourko, Y Shen, J Wu, R Zhang - China Economic Review, 2022 - Elsevier
China's land finance system has been a key contributor to the country's “economic miracle”
over recent decades. While there is much existing research on different components of the …

[PDF][PDF] 中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究

周黎安 - 2007 - erj.cn
内容提要: 本文研究了中国地方官员的治理模式)))/晋升锦标赛治理模式0 的性质与特征,
并试图揭示这种特定模式与中国高速经济增长及其各种特有问题的内在关联. 本文认为 …

[PDF][PDF] 晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因

周黎安 - 经济研究, 2004 - researchgate.net
内容提要: 过去大量的研究强调自行政性分权和财政包干改革以来地方官员的财政激励对区域
经济发展及其互动的影响. 本文建立了一个地方官员政治晋升博弈的简单模型 …

A spatial effect study on financial agglomeration promoting the green development of urban agglomerations

Y Tian, R Wang, L Liu, Y Ren - Sustainable Cities and Society, 2021 - Elsevier
The realization path of urban agglomerations' green development (UGD) varies by the
characteristic differences of financial agglomeration (FA). We decomposed FA from new …

[PDF][PDF] 中国上下分治的治理体制及其稳定机制

曹正汉 - 社会学研究, 2011 - shxyj.ajcass.com
本文认为, 中国治理体制的基本特征是治官权与治民权分设, 形成“上下分治的治理体制”.
中央政府主要执掌治官权, 即选拔, 监督和奖惩官员的权力; 至于实际管治各地区民众的权力 …

Environmental decentralization, local government competition, and regional green development: Evidence from China

H Wu, Y Li, Y Hao, S Ren, P Zhang - Science of the total environment, 2020 - Elsevier
Environmental management systems may play an important role in environmental pollution
control. Given China's rapid economic development and increases in environmental …

Can environmental monitoring power transition curb corporate greenwashing behavior?

D Zhang - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2023 - Elsevier
To address ecological, climate and environmental issues in sustainable growth, local
ecological environmental monitoring power withdrawal (EEMPW) by the Chinese State …

Busting the “Princelings”: The campaign against corruption in China's primary land market

T Chen, JK Kung - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2019 - academic.oup.com
Using data on over a million land transactions during 2004–2016 where local governments
are the sole seller, we find that firms linked to members of China's supreme political elites …

[引用][C] 政府干预, GDP 增长与地方国企过度投资

唐雪松, 周晓苏, 马如静 - 金融研究, 2010

[引用][C] 地方官员与经济增长——来自中国省长, 省委书记交流的证据

徐现祥, 王贤彬, 舒元 - 经济研究, 2007