The mechanism design approach to student assignment involves the theoretical, empirical,
and experimental study of systems used to allocate students into schools around the world …

The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer
science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making …

Matching problems with preferences are all around us: they arise when agents seek to be
allocated to one another on the basis of ranked preferences over potential outcomes …

This paper proposes a new mechanism for combinatorial assignment—for example,
assigning schedules of courses to students—based on an approximation to competitive …

Most transplanted kidneys are from cadavers, but there are also many transplants from live
donors. Recently, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two donor-patient …

Economists have lately been called upon not only to analyze markets, but to design them.
Market design involves a responsibility for detail, a need to deal with all of a market's …

We assisted the New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE) in designing a
mechanism to match over 90,000 entering students to public high schools each year. This …

The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among
efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze …

The literature on exchange of indivisible goods finds natural application in the exchange of
live donor kidneys for transplant. However, in kidney exchange, there are constraints on the …

The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a
profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching …