We use a unique combination of register and survey data from Amsterdam to investigate the
performance of school assignment mechanisms in practice. We find that deferred …

A mechanism is strategy-proof if agents can never profitably manipulate it, in any state of the
world; however, not all non-strategy-proof mechanisms are equally easy to manipulate …

School districts in the United States and around the world are increasingly moving away
from traditional neighborhood school assignment, in which pupils attend closest schools to …

We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for
studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a …

This paper introduces a new matching mechanism that is a hybrid of the two most common
mechanisms in school choice, the Boston Mechanism (BM) and the Deferred Acceptance …

Automated decision-making is a process in which an algorithm collects and analyses data,
derives information, applies this information, and recommends an action, at times using …

Many school districts in the US assign students to schools via the Boston mechanism. The
Boston mechanism is not strategy-proof, and it is easy to manipulate. We slightly modify the …

The one-sided matching problem is concerned with the allocation of indivisible goods to self-
interested agents with privately known preferences. Monetary transfers are not permitted …

We study priority-based matching markets with public and private endowments. We show
that efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance (EADA) is justified-envy minimal in the class of …

We consider three important, non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms: Probabilistic
Serial and two variants of the Boston mechanism. Under each of these mechanisms, we …