We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is
expectation-based loss averse according to Kőoszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal …

We study a principal agent model where agents derive a sense of pride from accomplishing
production goals. As in classical models, the principal offers a pay-per-performance wage to …

I develop a dynamic model of individual decisionmaking in which the agent derives utility
from physical outcomes as well as from rational beliefs about physical outcomes …

The objective of this paper is to integrate the idea of Pygmalion or self-fulfilling prophecy
research into the subjective expected utility framework of inequality in educational …

A consistent empirical literature shows that in many organizations supervisors systematically
overrate their employees' performance. Such leniency bias is at odds with the standard …

By extending the equilibrium concepts of Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006, Kőszegi and Rabin,
2007, this paper analyzes the strategic interaction of expectation-based loss-averse players …

We investigate a multi‐agent moral‐hazard model where agents have expectation‐based
reference‐dependent preferences à la Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). We show that even …

Herein follows a research and analysis concerning the possible occurrence of the
Pygmalion effect, a type of self-fulfilling prophecy, in the classrooms of the Academy of …

This paper studies the intertemporal allocation of incentives in a repeated moral hazard
model with reference-dependent preferences as in Koszegi and Rabin (2009). Besides …

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to show that principals can defer all incentives for
present effort to future payments—and thus pay fixed wages—and still motivate workers at …