The paper surveys the experimental literature on centralized matching markets, covering
school choice and college admissions models. In the school choice model, one side of the …

While much of the school choice literature advocates strategyproofness, recent research has
aimed to improve efficiency using mechanisms that rely on non-truthtelling equilibria. We …

We experimentally study the Gale and Shapley, 1962 mechanism, which is utilized in a wide
set of applications, most prominently the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) …

In the context of school choice, we experimentally study how behavior and outcomes are
affected when, instead of submitting rankings in the student-proposing or school-proposing …

The paper surveys the experimental literature on matching markets. It covers house
allocation, school choice, and two-sided matching markets such as college admissions. The …

We present an experimental study of decentralized two-sided matching markets with no
transfers. Experimental participants are informed of everyone's preferences and can make …

Although no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for
all participants (Roth, 1982), recent studies have presented conditions under which truthful …

Following the advice of economists, school choice programs around the world have lately
been adopting strategy-proof mechanisms. However, experimental evidence presents a …

We investigate strategic behavior in a centralized matching clearinghouse based on the
Gale–Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm. To do so, we conduct a laboratory experiment …

In many matching markets, bargaining determines who matches with whom and on what
terms. We experimentally investigate allocative efficiency and how subjects' payoffs depend …