I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two‐sided dynamic matching markets
where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time,(ii) matching is one‐to‐one, and (iii) …

Coalition formation is concerned with the question of how to partition a set of agents into
disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. Deviating from most of the previous work …

Following up on purely theoretical work, we contribute further theoretical insights into
adapting stable two-sided matchings to change. Moreover, we perform extensive empirical …

This chapter surveys the literature on dynamic matching markets, both its study of specific
market institutions and the allocations they can implement, and that of reduced-form solution …

When computing stable matchings, it is usually assumed that the preferences of the agents
in the matching market are fixed. However, in many realistic scenarios, preferences change …

We introduce the problem of adapting a stable matching to forced and forbidden pairs. Given
a stable matching M 1, a set Q of forced pairs, and a set P of forbidden pairs, we want to find …

Collective decision making problems capture situations where the preferences of agents
need to be aggregated into a compromise solution. This thesis focuses on two such …

Abstract The Hospital Residents setting models important problems like school choice,
assignment of undergraduate students to degree programs, among many others. In this …

Assigning applicants to posts in the presence of the preferences of applicants and quotas
associated with posts is extensively investigated. For a post, lower quota guarantees, and …

We focus on an online 2-stage problem, motivated by the following situation: consider a
system where students shall be assigned to universities. There is a first round where some …