The economics of fairness, reciprocity and altruism–experimental evidence and new theories

E Fehr, KM Schmidt - Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and …, 2006 - Elsevier
Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that material
self-interest exclusively motivates all people. Experimental economists have gathered …

Making agency theory work for supply chain relationships: a systematic review across four disciplines

J Matinheikki, K Kauppi, A Brandon–Jones… - International Journal of …, 2022 - emerald.com
Purpose Contemporary supply chain relationships inherently rely on delegation of work
between organizations and, thus, are subject to agency problems for which a wide range of …

Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity

E Fehr, S Gächter - Journal of economic perspectives, 2000 - aeaweb.org
This paper shows that reciprocity has powerful implications for many economic domains. It is
an important determinant in the enforcement of contracts and social norms and enhances …

Promises and partnership

G Charness, M Dufwenberg - Econometrica, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our
design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with …

Lab labor: What can labor economists learn from the lab?

G Charness, P Kuhn - Handbook of labor economics, 2011 - Elsevier
This chapter surveys the contributions of laboratory experiments to labor economics. We
begin with a discussion of methodological issues: when (and why) is a lab experiment the …

Fairness and contract design

E Fehr, A Klein, KM Schmidt - Econometrica, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual
and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a …

The effects of performance measurement and compensation on motivation: An empirical study

M Van Herpen, M Van Praag, K Cools - De economist, 2005 - Springer
This paper analyzes empirically the relationship between pay and performance. Economic
and psychological theories predict that the design and implementation of a performance …

[图书][B] The economics of contracts: Theories and applications

E Brousseau, JM Glachant - 2002 - books.google.com
A contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms
of their behavior to coordinate. As this concept has become essential to economics in the …

Fairness and incentives in a multi‐task principal–agent model

E Fehr, KM Schmidt - The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
This paper reports on a two‐task principal–agent experiment in which only one task is
contractible. The principal can either offer a piece‐rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the …

Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives

S Bowles, SH Hwang - Journal of public economics, 2008 - Elsevier
Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold
ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable …