The economics of fairness, reciprocity and altruism–experimental evidence and new theories
E Fehr, KM Schmidt - Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and …, 2006 - Elsevier
Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that material
self-interest exclusively motivates all people. Experimental economists have gathered …
self-interest exclusively motivates all people. Experimental economists have gathered …
Making agency theory work for supply chain relationships: a systematic review across four disciplines
Purpose Contemporary supply chain relationships inherently rely on delegation of work
between organizations and, thus, are subject to agency problems for which a wide range of …
between organizations and, thus, are subject to agency problems for which a wide range of …
Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity
This paper shows that reciprocity has powerful implications for many economic domains. It is
an important determinant in the enforcement of contracts and social norms and enhances …
an important determinant in the enforcement of contracts and social norms and enhances …
Promises and partnership
G Charness, M Dufwenberg - Econometrica, 2006 - Wiley Online Library
We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our
design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with …
design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with …
Lab labor: What can labor economists learn from the lab?
G Charness, P Kuhn - Handbook of labor economics, 2011 - Elsevier
This chapter surveys the contributions of laboratory experiments to labor economics. We
begin with a discussion of methodological issues: when (and why) is a lab experiment the …
begin with a discussion of methodological issues: when (and why) is a lab experiment the …
Fairness and contract design
E Fehr, A Klein, KM Schmidt - Econometrica, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual
and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a …
and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a …
The effects of performance measurement and compensation on motivation: An empirical study
M Van Herpen, M Van Praag, K Cools - De economist, 2005 - Springer
This paper analyzes empirically the relationship between pay and performance. Economic
and psychological theories predict that the design and implementation of a performance …
and psychological theories predict that the design and implementation of a performance …
[图书][B] The economics of contracts: Theories and applications
E Brousseau, JM Glachant - 2002 - books.google.com
A contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms
of their behavior to coordinate. As this concept has become essential to economics in the …
of their behavior to coordinate. As this concept has become essential to economics in the …
Fairness and incentives in a multi‐task principal–agent model
E Fehr, KM Schmidt - The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
This paper reports on a two‐task principal–agent experiment in which only one task is
contractible. The principal can either offer a piece‐rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the …
contractible. The principal can either offer a piece‐rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the …
Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives
Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold
ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable …
ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable …