This paper provides new bounds on the quality of equilibria in finite congestion games with
affine cost functions, specifically for atomic network routing games. It is well known that the …

In situations without central coordination, the price of anarchy relates the quality of any Nash
equilibrium to the quality of a global optimum. Instead of assuming that all players choose …

We consider network cost-sharing games with nonanonymous cost functions, where the cost
of each edge is a submodular function of its users, and this cost is shared using the Shapley …

In the “The curse of simultaneity”, Paes Leme et al. show that there are interesting classes of
games for which sequential decision making and corresponding subgame perfect equilibria …

We study a sequential version of the KP-model: Each of n agents has a job to be processed
on any of m machines. Agents sequentially select a machine for processing their jobs. The …

We study the performance of Subgame Perfect Equilibria, a solution concept which better
captures the players' rationality in sequential games with respect to the classical myopic …

We study the performance of subgame perfect equilibria, a solution concept which better
captures the players' rationality in sequential games with respect to the classical myopic …

This paper determines the sequential price of anarchy for Rosenthal congestion games with
affine cost functions and few players. We show that for two players, the sequential price of …

We study capacitated facility location games, where players control terminals and need to
connect each one to a facility from a set of possible locations. There are opening costs and …

In situations where multiple parties are involved, individual selfish decisions result in
outcomes that rarely align with what is best for society. In order to compare the quality of …