We study two recent combinatorial contract design models, which highlight different sources
of complexity that may arise in contract design, where a principal delegates the execution of …

I study a moral hazard problem between a principal and multiple agents who experience
positive peer effects represented by a (weighted) network. Under the optimal linear contract …

Risk-averse workers in a team exert effort to produce joint output. Workers' incentives are
connected via chains of productivity spillovers, represented by a network of peer-effects. We …

We study the principal-agent setting, where a principal delegates the execution of a costly
project to an agent. In the classical model, the agent chooses an action among a set of …

Risk-averse workers in a team exert effort to produce joint output. Workers' incentives are
connected via chains of productivity spillovers, represented by a network of peer-effects. We …

A principal uses bonuses conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit
costly effort from the team members. We characterize the allocation of incentive pay across …

We study a team incentive design problem where multiple agents are located on a network
and work on a joint project. The principal seeks the least costly mechanism to incentivize full …

I propose a theory to study the optimal compensation scheme in organizations with arbitrary
interpersonal networks, in which agents connected in a network help neighbors and work …