Two main career paths are prevalent among politicians in modern democracies: there are
career politicians (ie, politicians who work in the political sector until retirement), and political …

Most theories of elections assume that voters and political actors are fully rational. While
these formulations produce many insights, they also generate anomalies--most famously …

We compare turnout under proportional power‐sharing electoral systems and winner‐take‐
all elections. The effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the …

We investigate the welfare effects of policies that increase voter turnout in costly voting
models. In a generalized costly voting model, we show that if the electorate is sufficiently …

We study the recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium
model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that …

Political economy has primarily paid attention to the principal‐agent relationship between
citizens and politicians and the role of competition and institutions in disciplining political …

We model a two-alternative election in which voters may acquire information about which is
the best alternative for all voters. Voters differ in their cost of acquiring information. We show …

In this paper, I discuss recent developments in political economy. By focusing on the
microeconomic side of the discipline, I present an overview of current research on four of the …

I propose a game-theoretic model of costly voting that predicts significant turnout rates even
when the electorate is arbitrarily large. The model has two key features that jointly drive the …

Voting games and other collective decision situations pose particular challenges for game
theory. Often, there is a plethora of Nash equilibria, which creates coordination problems …