We experimentally study the disincentive effect of taxing work and redistributing tax
revenues when redistribution is imposed vs. democratically chosen in a vote. We find a …

A novel laboratory experiment is used to show that mismatching between task preferences
and task assignment strongly undermines worker performance and leads to free riding in …

I am honored to have delivered the Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture at Columbia University and to
have contributed this book to the series of Arrow Lecture volumes. In my opinion, Ken was …

A novel laboratory experiment is used to show that the state of people's self-regulatory
resources influences their reliance on the formal enforcement of norms in a social dilemma …

Exogenously imposed infinite repetition is known to mitigate people's uncooperative
behaviors in dilemma situations with partner matching through personal enforcement. One …

The paper examines whether an institution has a differing impact on cooperation if it is
introduced by a representative of the affected subjects rather than exogenously imposed …

A number of papers document that rules governing social dilemmas work better when
implemented democratically than when imposed from above (the “effect of democracy”). This …

We examine institutional preferences, social preferences, contribution in public goods
games, and their relationships by conducting a lab-in-the-field experiment in rural China …

In a laboratory real-effort experiment, we study the effect of responsibility on performance.
Specifically, we analyze whether being responsible for an ethical or unethical work …

Teams are increasingly popular decision‐making and work units in firms. This paper uses a
novel real‐effort experiment to show that (a) some teams in the workplace reduce their …