Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked,
single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the …

A survey of papers on practically significant restrictions on the preference profile of a
collective is carried out, including single-peaked preferences, group-separable preferences …

Algorithmic decision-making has become ubiquitous in our societal and economic lives.
With more and more decisions being delegated to algorithms, we have also encountered …

When selecting multiple candidates based on approval preferences of voters, the
proportional representation of voters' opinions is an important and well-studied desideratum …

Restricted domains over voter preferences have been extensively studied within the area of
computational social choice, initially for preferences that are total orders over the set of …

We investigate the complexity of several manipulation and control problems under
numerous prevalent approval-based multiwinner voting rules. Particularly, the rules we …

A variety of constructive manipulation, control, and bribery for approval-based multi-winner
voting have been extensively studied very recently. However, their destructive counterparts …

We study the parameterized complexity of winner determination problems for three prevalent
k-committee selection rules, namely the minimax approval voting (MAV), the proportional …

Justified Representation (JR)/Extended Justified Representation (EJR) is a desirable axiom
in multiwinner approval voting. In contrast to (E) JR only requires at least\emph {one} voter to …

Abstract We consider GROUP CONTROL BY ADDING INDIVIDUALS (GCAI) in the setting of
group identification for two procedural rules—the consensus-start-respecting rule and the …