Recent developments in the theory of regulation

M Armstrong, DEM Sappington - Handbook of industrial organization, 2007 - Elsevier
This chapter reviews recent theoretical work on the design of regulatory policy, focusing on
the complications that arise when regulated suppliers have better information about the …

From market failures to market opportunities: managing innovation under asymmetric information

P Barbaroux - Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, 2014 - Springer
This article presents a review of the literature that focuses on the role played by information
asymmetry in the management of innovation. Results are organised in two categories. On …

Misselling through agents

R Inderst, M Ottaviani - American Economic Review, 2009 - aeaweb.org
This paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by
direct marketing agents: prospecting for customers and advising on the product's “suitability” …

Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public‐‐private partnerships

E Iossa, D Martimort - The RAND journal of economics, 2012 - Wiley Online Library
We study the agency costs of delegated public service provision, focusing on the link
between organizational forms and uncertainty at project implementation. We consider a …

[图书][B] Corporate environmentalism and public policy

TP Lyon, JW Maxwell - 2004 - books.google.com
This is the first book to provide a hard-headed economic view of the voluntary approaches to
environmental issues, especially toxic chemicals, waste disposal and global warming, that …

Information acquisition and institutional design

MC Stephenson - Harv. L. Rev., 2010 - HeinOnline
Although good information is critical to effective decisionmaking, public agents' private
incentives to invest in gathering information may not align with the social interest in their …

Contracts and productive information gathering

J Crémer, F Khalil, JC Rochet - Games and Economic Behavior, 1998 - Elsevier
We modify a standard Baron–Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the state
of nature, the agent has to incur a cost γ to learn it. Under these conditions, the principal will …

Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered

J Crémer, F Khalil, JC Rochet - Journal of Economic Theory, 1998 - Elsevier
In a Baron–Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but
can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a …

The hold‐up problem and incomplete contracts: a survey of recent topics in contract theory

PW Schmitz - Bulletin of economic research, 2001 - Wiley Online Library
The Hold‚•’Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory
Page 1 {Journals}boer/53_1/y133/makeup/y133.3d © Blackwell Publishers Ltd and the Board …

Public‐private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering

EI Hoppe, PW Schmitz - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2013 - Wiley Online Library
A government agency wants a facility to be built and managed to provide a public service.
Two different modes of provision are considered. In a public‐private partnership, the tasks of …