An analysis of the German university admissions system

A Westkamp - Economic Theory, 2013 - Springer
This paper analyzes the sequential admissions procedure for medical subjects at public
universities in Germany. Complete information equilibrium outcomes are shown to be …

A theory of school‐choice lotteries

O Kesten, MU Ünver - Theoretical Economics, 2015 - Wiley Online Library
We introduce a new notion of ex ante stability (or fairness) that would be desirable for a
school‐choice mechanism to satisfy. Our criterion stipulates that a mechanism must be …

School choice under partial fairness

U Dur, AA Gitmez, Ö Yılmaz - Theoretical Economics, 2019 - Wiley Online Library
We generalize the school choice problem by defining a notion of allowable priority
violations. In this setting, a weak axiom of stability (partial stability) allows only certain priority …

Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement

S Alva, V Manjunath - Journal of Economic Theory, 2019 - Elsevier
We consider a model where each agent has an outside option of privately known value. At a
given allocation, we call the set of agents who do not exercise their outside options the …

A market design approach to job rotation

J Yu, J Zhang - Games and economic behavior, 2020 - Elsevier
Organizations often rotate employees' jobs. This paper proposes a market design approach
to organize job rotation. In our model each employee has occupied a position, and if any …

School choice with asymmetric information: Priority design and the curse of acceptance

A Kloosterman, P Troyan - Theoretical Economics, 2020 - Wiley Online Library
We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and
differentially informed students. We show that, in general, the commonly used deferred …

On (constrained) efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment

C Basteck, L Ehlers - Available at SSRN 4727480, 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
We study random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents, when each agent
is to receive one object and has strict preferences over the objects. Random Serial …

Strategy‐proof tie‐breaking in matching with priorities

L Ehlers, A Westkamp - Theoretical Economics, 2018 - Wiley Online Library
A set of indivisible objects is allocated among agents with strict preferences. Each object has
a weak priority ranking of the agents. A collection of priority rankings, a priority structure, is …

Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities

X Han - Games and Economic Behavior, 2018 - Elsevier
We study the indivisible object allocation problem without monetary transfer, in which each
object is endowed with a weak priority ordering over agents. It is well known that stability is …

[PDF][PDF] Stable-dominating rules

S Alva, V Manjunath - 2019 - isid.ac.in
We consider a general model of indivisible goods allocation with choice-based priorities, as
well as the special case of school choice. Stability is the main normative consideration for …