An analysis of the German university admissions system
A Westkamp - Economic Theory, 2013 - Springer
This paper analyzes the sequential admissions procedure for medical subjects at public
universities in Germany. Complete information equilibrium outcomes are shown to be …
universities in Germany. Complete information equilibrium outcomes are shown to be …
A theory of school‐choice lotteries
We introduce a new notion of ex ante stability (or fairness) that would be desirable for a
school‐choice mechanism to satisfy. Our criterion stipulates that a mechanism must be …
school‐choice mechanism to satisfy. Our criterion stipulates that a mechanism must be …
School choice under partial fairness
We generalize the school choice problem by defining a notion of allowable priority
violations. In this setting, a weak axiom of stability (partial stability) allows only certain priority …
violations. In this setting, a weak axiom of stability (partial stability) allows only certain priority …
Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
S Alva, V Manjunath - Journal of Economic Theory, 2019 - Elsevier
We consider a model where each agent has an outside option of privately known value. At a
given allocation, we call the set of agents who do not exercise their outside options the …
given allocation, we call the set of agents who do not exercise their outside options the …
A market design approach to job rotation
J Yu, J Zhang - Games and economic behavior, 2020 - Elsevier
Organizations often rotate employees' jobs. This paper proposes a market design approach
to organize job rotation. In our model each employee has occupied a position, and if any …
to organize job rotation. In our model each employee has occupied a position, and if any …
School choice with asymmetric information: Priority design and the curse of acceptance
A Kloosterman, P Troyan - Theoretical Economics, 2020 - Wiley Online Library
We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and
differentially informed students. We show that, in general, the commonly used deferred …
differentially informed students. We show that, in general, the commonly used deferred …
On (constrained) efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
We study random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents, when each agent
is to receive one object and has strict preferences over the objects. Random Serial …
is to receive one object and has strict preferences over the objects. Random Serial …
Strategy‐proof tie‐breaking in matching with priorities
L Ehlers, A Westkamp - Theoretical Economics, 2018 - Wiley Online Library
A set of indivisible objects is allocated among agents with strict preferences. Each object has
a weak priority ranking of the agents. A collection of priority rankings, a priority structure, is …
a weak priority ranking of the agents. A collection of priority rankings, a priority structure, is …
Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
X Han - Games and Economic Behavior, 2018 - Elsevier
We study the indivisible object allocation problem without monetary transfer, in which each
object is endowed with a weak priority ordering over agents. It is well known that stability is …
object is endowed with a weak priority ordering over agents. It is well known that stability is …
[PDF][PDF] Stable-dominating rules
S Alva, V Manjunath - 2019 - isid.ac.in
We consider a general model of indivisible goods allocation with choice-based priorities, as
well as the special case of school choice. Stability is the main normative consideration for …
well as the special case of school choice. Stability is the main normative consideration for …