Econophysics review: II. Agent-based models

A Chakraborti, IM Toke, M Patriarca… - Quantitative …, 2011 - Taylor & Francis
This article is the second part of a review of recent empirical and theoretical developments
usually grouped under the heading Econophysics. In the first part, we reviewed the statistical …

Seller reputation

H Bar-Isaac, S Tadelis - Foundations and Trends® in …, 2008 - nowpublishers.com
Seller reputation is an important asset because buyers often choose sellers on the basis of
their reputation. This is particularly true when the quality of the good or service transacted is …

Factors influencing contractual choice and sustainable relationships in European agri-food supply chains

C Fischer, M Hartmann, N Reynolds… - European Review of …, 2009 - academic.oup.com
The role of inter-enterprise relationships in European pig meat, beef and cereals chains is
analysed. Using survey data from 1,442 farmers, processors and retailers in six countries …

Extortion can outperform generosity in the iterated prisoner's dilemma

Z Wang, Y Zhou, JW Lien, J Zheng, B Xu - Nature communications, 2016 - nature.com
Abstract Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies, as discovered by Press and Dyson, can enforce a
linear relationship between a pair of players' scores in the iterated prisoner's dilemma …

Building successful NGO–business relationships: A social capital perspective

M Moshtari, E Vanpoucke - Journal of Supply Chain …, 2021 - Wiley Online Library
While NGO–business relationships have much in common with buyer–supplier
relationships, the literature specifically indicates several additional challenges in achieving …

Irrigation infrastructure and trust: Evidence from natural and lab-in-the-field experiments in rural communities

K Aoyagi, Y Sawada, M Shoji - World Development, 2022 - Elsevier
Does irrigation infrastructure lead to trust, and how does this happen? We approach these
questions by testing two processes of trust formation: particularized trust built on repeated …

[PDF][PDF] Towards a belief-based theory of repeated games with private monitoring: An application of POMDP

M Kandori, I Obara - Report.[694], 2010 - pseweb.eu
An equilibrium in a repeated game with imperfect private moitoring is called a finite state
equilibrium, if each player's action on the equilibrium path is given by an automaton with a …

Weakly belief‐free equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring

M Kandori - Econometrica, 2011 - Wiley Online Library
Repeated games with imperfect private monitoring have a wide range of applications, but a
complete characterization of all equilibria in this class of games has yet to be obtained. The …

A contract-based incentive mechanism for distributed meeting scheduling: Can agents who value privacy tell the truth?

B Di, NR Jennings - Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2021 - Springer
We consider a distributed meeting scheduling problem where agents negotiate with each
other to reach a consensus over the starting time of the meeting. Each agent has a private …

Labor union members play an OLG repeated game

M Kandori, S Obayashi - Proceedings of the National …, 2014 - National Acad Sciences
Humans are capable of cooperating with one another even when it is costly and a deviation
provides an immediate gain. An important reason is that cooperation is reciprocated or …